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I INTRODUCTION 
From the 1880s to the mid-1970s, numbers of staff in the Scottish 
Office roughly doubled every twenty years. From the later 1970s to the mid-
1980s, the Scottish Office entered a climate of attempts at retrenchment in 
public spending and employment. How did a bureaucracy with nearly a 
century of continuous growth behind it respond to such a change in its 
environment? 
This paper explores the development of the Scottish Office from that 
perspective. Its method is to track changes in the readily- measurable 
characteristics of Scottish departments, from documentary and other 
'unobtrusive' sources. It extends into over-time analysis an earlier study 
which explored whether the Scottish Office in the late 1970s could be 
demonstrated to have features measurably distinctive from 'Whitehall', or 
the remainder of UK central government departments. (Z) 
This paper is in two broad parts, exploring the background of long-
term growth and the foreground of attempts at retrenchment. In the next 
section, we therefore present a brief sketch of the development of the 
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Scottish central bureaucracy since the Scottish Office was founded a 
century ago. Over so long a period, we can only use relatively 'gross' 
indices, and those in a pretty 'broad brush' treatment, for we are limited to 
data that are available in a roughly consistent form over the whole of that 
time. In the section after that (Section III), we come to the era of attempted 
retrenchment in the 1970s and 1980s to date, and compare in finer detail the 
way in which the Scottish Office and its component departments changed 
over that time, in relation to developments in 'Whitehall'. A few 
concluding remarks are offered in the final section. 
II THE BACKGROUND : LONG-TERM GROWTH OF SCOTTISH 
CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY(3l 
When the Scottish Office was created in 1885, it did not move into 
uninhabited territory. Apart from UK or GB-wide departments with 
offices in Scotland, a traditional administrative apparatus already existed, 
in the shape of the Lord Advocate's Department, the Exchequer Office, 
the offices surrounding the law courts, the Registrar-General's Office, the 
Department of the Registers, and the National Gallery of Scotland (in 
possession of an annuity dating from the Treaty of Union). This group of 
small departments, which we can loosely term the 'eighteenth-century' 
bureaucracy of Scotland, has remained more or less separate from the 
Scottish Office to this day; and since 1885 this group has been augmented by 
the National Library of Scotland, the National Museum of Antiquities and 
the Scottish Record Office (formerly part of the Department of the 
Registers). We shall call this set of departments the 'independents'. 
Beside this group, there were a number of autonomous central boards 
and departments for Scotland (not necessarily in Scotland), many of them 
paralleling Irish agencies, which have subsequently become part of the 
Scottish Office. In 1885 there were the Fishery Board (DAFS), the Lunacy 
Commission (SHHD), the Board of Supervision for the Relief of the Poor 
and for Public Health (SHHD), the Prison Commissioners (SHHD) and 
the Scotch Education Department (SED); to which were later added the 
Crofters Commission (DAFS), the Local Government Board (SDD), the 
Board of Agriculture (DAFS), the Highlands and Islands Medical Service 
Board (SHHD) and the Scottish Board of Health (SHHD). We shall call 
this group of departments, which existed as distinct departments or boards 
in or for Scotland prior to their incorporation in the Scottish Office, the 
'kernel' departments. In 1885 the Scotch Education Department (with its 
HQ in London and its schools inspectorate in Edinburgh) dwarfed the rest 
of this group in terms of the budget which it controlled; and the Prison 
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The development of the two groups of departments, the 'independent' 
departments and the 'kernel' departments later absorbed into the Scottish 
Office, has taken rather different paths over the century. 
Let us take the Scottish Office grour, to start with. Several commenta-
tors on the growth of the Scottish Office 4) have emphasized the way that it 
has eaten into what was formerly the administrative territory of UK or GB 
ministries, while yielding very little of its own territory. Such a process of 
transfer of functions, taking place over a long period, might be expected to 
show up in an increased 'share of the cake' going to the Scottish depart-
ments (whateverkindof'cake' it may be), and a rise in the place ofthe Scot-
tish Office in the 'pecking order' of central government departments. The 
same supposition might be drawn from the oft-noted progression of the 
Scottish Secretary from the status of a minister sometimes excluded from a 
Cabinet seat to one assured of a Cabinet seat from 1892 and of senior Ca-
binet rank from 1926<5l. 
This expectation is certainly confirmed in relation to spending power. 
If we express the budgetary estimates of the 'kernel' Scottish Office depart-
ments as a proportion of the UK Civil Estimates (that is, excluding military 
spending, which presents complications owing to open-ended military esti-
mates during war periods), there is a noticeable and steady growth in the 
proportion over the century up to the mid-1970s. In 1885 this group of de-
partments accounted for less than 3 per cent of UK gross estimated (civil) 
spending, and though there were falls in both World Wars, the proportion 
had more than doubled by the 1960s and nearly trebled by the mid-1970s. 
The proportion fell back somewhat in 1984-5; but there is no doubt that the 
Scottish Office 'share of the cake', in terms of spending, has grown signifi-
cantly over the past century. 
If we turn from budget to the other major measurable resource of go-
vernment bureaucracies - manpower - the picture is rather different. 
Numbers of staff in the 'kernel' departments certainly grew steadily for 
most of the century - in fact, they doubled approximately every twenty 
years from 1885 to 1975, describing a 'natural growth' curve ofremarkable 
elegance until the late 1970s, when numbers flattened out and began to fall 
back a little. But if we express the numbers as a proportion of total UK civil 
servants, as best we can, the Scottish Office departments' share ofthe cake 
show a less steady expansion. There is no consistent run of comparable fig-
ures for total UK civil servants from 1885 to date, so the comparison can on-
ly be rough-and-ready. But from what figures are available, it would appear 
that, up until World War II, the Scottish Office was running to keep still, in 
the sense that staff growth in the Scottish Office kernel departments no 
more than kept pace with the general growth in numbers of civil servants in 
the UK. Their staff comprised roughly 0.6 per cent of the UK total in the 
1890s, and this proportion did not rise (and even fell) until the 1960s, rising 
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GROWTH TRAJECTORIES 
Numbers of Staff in 5 Selected Staff Groups 1885-1983/4 
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lord Advocate's Dept. 
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Source. Budget Estimates and Scottish Office Staff Returns 
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and-ready figures of this type is not exactly a difference that you can mea-
sure with a foot-rule. We conclude that any acceleration of staff growth in 
the Scottish Office kernel departments, in relation to the UK civil service as 
a whole, appears to be very slight; to the extent that it has taken place at all, 
it is a phenomenon only of recent years, not of the century as a whole. 
Take these two histories together (spending and staff numbers), and it 
is clear that the Scottish Office departments nowadays utilize their budgets 
on things other than paying bureaucrats, compared with their early days. 
They have increasingly adopted a 'money-moving' style of operation, 
spending money on grants and contracts, rather than themselves employing 
staff to carry out operations directly. In 1885, the kernel Scottish Office 
departments collectively spent over 11 per cent of their gross budget on 
staff salaries; that figure fell fairly steadily over the subsequent century, to 
about 2 percent in 1984-5. this, however, does not make the Scottish Office 
distinctive in its pattern of development: it reflects an overall UK trend 
towards 'chequebook government'. 
While all the kernel Scottish Office departments have grown in staff 
and spending over the century, in the aggregate and individually, that 
growth has by no means been uniform among the component departments, 
with each retaining its original share of the overall expansion. Markedly 
differential growth has occurred, as can be seen for staff numbers in five 
selected units (three 'kernel', two 'independent') in Figure 1, and the same 
is true of spending. Take, for example, the two dominant elements among 
the kernel departments in 1885: the prisons administration and the SED. 
Prisons accounted for over threequarters of the staff numbers in this group 
of departments in 1885 and nearly 15 per cent of spending: by 1984/5, prison 
staff were just a quarter of the whole, and spending on prisons about 1 per 
cent. For SED the picture is less clear-cut. Its share of the spending of the 
group rose from 65 per cent in 1885 to 91 per cent in 1905, but then fell to 
below 50 per cent by 1945. Subsequently, the development of block grants 
to local authorities took the bulk of the direct funding of local authority 
schools out of SED's hands, leaving it, by 1984/5, with about 4 per cent of 
the spending of the Scottish Office group of departments. Similarly, SED 
staff numbers rose from 10 per cent of the group total in 1885 to 22 per cent 
in 1915, but fell back subsequently, ending up as a rather smaller 
proportion than it had been in 1885. Plainly, there is no simple 
'proportional growth law' in operation here, to explain the increase in size 
of these bureaucracies. 
Turning to the other group of Scottish departments, which we called 
the 'independents': over the bulk of the period since 1885, the picture (in 
contrast to that for the 'kernel' departments) is one of stagnation and 
relative decline, in both budget and staff numbers, whether measured 
against the rest of the Scottish departments or against the UK total. As can 
be seen from Table 1, some degree of recovery took place for this group 
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between 1975-6 and 1984-5, with a 37 per cent increase in staff and an 
increase in budgetary shares. (The growth points in the group were the 
Department of the Registers, where a new land registration system meant a 
doubling in staff numbers, and the Procurator Fiscal service and Scottish 
Courts Administration, reflecting increased emphasis on 'law and order' 
activities since 1979.) But in the overall period between 1885 and 1984-5, 
the budgets of the 'independent' group as a proportion of UK gross (civil) 
estimates fell from 0. 74 per cent to 0.06 per cent; and as against the budgets 
of the 'kernel' Scottish Office departments, fell from nearly 29 per cent to 1 
per cent. There is no complete record of staff numbers for the 
'independent' group until the 1930s (Procurators Fiscal and Sheriff Court 
staffs were not enumerated in the regular civil service style until then); but 
what can be said with certainty is that in 1885 the staff of the 'independent' 
Scottish departments together amounted to at least half of the total of the 
kernel Scottish Office departments (and in all probability considerably 
more than half), whereas by 1984/5 the proportion had fallen to less than a 
third. Figure 1 includes an example of a department from this group (the 
Lord Advocate's Department) which has not grown at all in absolute staff 
numbers over a century. 
As Table 1 shows, the 'independent' Scottish departments seem to be 
coming late to the shift towards a 'money-moving' style of operation. 
Although the percentage drop in the proportion of gross budget spent on 
officials' salaries between 1885 and 1984 is exactly the same for the 'kernel' 
Scottish Office departments and the independents, most of the change to a 
more money-moving style for the latter group comes in a sudden drop 
between 1975-6 and 1984-5 rather than in a steady change over decades; 
indeed the proportion of budget spent on staff salaries for the 'independent' 
group actually rose in the first twenty years from 1885 and remained above 
the 1885 level until the 1980s. The overall proiportion of budget devoted to 
official salaries by the independents remains much higher than that of the 
Scottish Office kernel departments, at over 50 per cent as against about 2 
per cent. 
How are we to explain this difference between the two groups of 
Scottish bureaucracies over the century since 1885? Perhaps it is that the 
'policy space' inhabited by the eighteenth-century bureaucracy did not 
include much room to expand. That is, agencies reflecting an eighteenth-
century philosophy of government administration that the 
implementation of public policy is a matter of enacting laws, and providing 
an apparatus of law courts to enforce them (plus a few bits of machinery for 
enumerating the population, registering land titles, guarding the nation's 
art treasures and so on) -have fewer in built tendencies to expand (even as 
the nation grows larger or richer), than agencies reflecting the nineteenth-
century administrative philosophy of providing a specialized bureaucracy 
for the self-conscious implementation of each succeeding policy. 
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Alternatively, perhaps the eighteenth-century bureaucracy was simply 
'crowded out' of what might otherwise have been its natural expansion 
space by competition from the nineteenth-century group.<7l (Hanham 
describes the opposition put up by successive Lords Advocate to proposals 
for creating a Scottish Office in the nineteenth century, and the eclipse of 
the Lord Advocate as a political potentate by the Scottish Secretary after 
the latter office had been created.) Or perhaps the different trajectories of 
growth displayed by the two groups of agencies reflects a general 'sclerosis' 
which is sometimes alleged to affect long-established organizations. (S) Yet 
again, perhaps departments which spend the bulk of their budgets on the 
employment of bureaucrats (as is certainly the case with the Scottish 
independents) are inherently less likely to display growth over a long 
period, simply because growth is in staff, an unpopular form, than are 
'money-moving' bureaucracies, which (we might suppose) attract a 
constituency of hopefuls and dependents who have reason to welcome 
expansion in budgets, without attracting the attention of the manpower-
savers. These are but speculations, which cannot be examined further here. 
III THE FOREGROUND : THE SCOTTISH OFFICE IN AN ERA OF 
RETRENCHMENT 
From that very sketchy background of the development of the Scottish 
Office over a century, we move to the foreground of history. After nearly a 
century of bureaucratic growth, the Scottish Office from the middle 1970s 
faced a climate of sustained attempts at retrenchment in the public sector. 
Accordingly, in this section, we examine what changes have taken place in 
the Scottish Office in relation to the attempts to cut public spending since 
1976 (from now on, we look at the Scottish Office only, excluding the 
'independent' group). Has its place in the Whitehall 'pecking order' 
changed, and, to the extent that any real cuts have taken place, how have 
those cuts been accommodated in its own structure? 
The Scottish Office in the Whitehall 'Pecking Order' 
Kellas and Madgwick<9l remark that the Scottish Office (together with 
the Welsh Office) is 'still obviously quite low in the Whitehall pecking 
order'; but they do not specify how low, nor whether it is moving up or 
down or constant, nor what 'league tables' they have in mind. Nor do they 
say how retrenchment might change the Scottish Office's ranking, although 
a climate of financial pressure is a good test of a bureaucratic pecking order, 
since marginal or peripheral departments are likely to suffer 
disproportionately from cutbacks as their fundamentally more powerful 
bureaucratic brethren seek to protect their own positions. A lightweight 
department may find itself classed as an administrative luxury, liable to 
suffer extra cuts during 'hard times'. Indeed, if the Scottish Office were that 
kind of lightweight, it might be in a particularly vulnerable position, since it 
shares bureaucratic 'turf in many of its areas of operation with other UK or 
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GB departments. 
Table 2 shows the position of the Scottish Office in four leagues over 
the past fifteen years or so, in relation to nine other major government 
departments which have been in existence in more or less unchanged form 
since 1971 (DHSS, DOE, MoD, Home Office, Welsh Office, MAFF, 
DES, Treasury, Department of Employment). The leagues are: share of 
total civil service staff, share of top staff (that is, posts graded at Under-
Secretary level or above), share of total spending and the ranking of 
departmental Ministers in the Cabinet. Ranking the Scottish Office against 
a set of constant comparators screens out some of the short -term variations 
in its rank relative to all departments which derive from the waxing and 
waning of the less stable Whitehall empires such as the DTI group. 
TABLE2 
Scottish Office Ranking relative to 9 other major Government Departments 
(1971-83) 
Year Cabinet 'Top' Total Gross actual 
staff staff spending 
Ranking-----------------------------
1971 7 n.a. 1 7 5 
1972 7 5 7 4 
1973 7 4 7 4 
1974 7 4 7 4 
1975 8 4 7 4 
1976 7 4 7 4 
1977 5 4 7 4 
1978 5 4 7 4 
1979 5 4 7 4 
1980 7 4 7 4 
1981 7 4 7 4 
1982 7 4 7 4 
1983 6 4 7 n.a. 2 
1 No common grading structure for 'top' staff before 1972. 
2 Appropriation Accounts for 1983-4 not yet available at time of writing. 
In fact, the Scottish Office's ranking in the Whitehall pecking order for 
these four leagues is not particularly low, nor has it fallen back during 'hard 
times'. Its position in three of the leagues is relatively stable: the ranking of 
the Scottish Secretary in the Cabinet is slightly more volatile, but no more 
so than that of many of the major departmental ministers. The 
department's position is high and stable in the league tables for top staff 
numbers ('brass') and for gross expenditure; at number four in both of 
61 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1985 
those leagues, it comes immediately behind the 'big three' bureaucratic 
giants in Whitehall (i.e. MoD, DHSS and DOE). Its place in the pecking 
order does not alter significantly in these leagues as between the period of 
overall government spending and staff growth in 1971-6 and the period of 
attempts at retrenchment from 1976 to 1984. It has held its position during 
hard times. 
Another aspect of pecking order, but one which does not quite so 
readily lend itself to 'league tabling' after the manner of Table 2, is that of 
the social exclusivity of senior officials- their 'top drawer rating', as it were. 
On this factor, Scottish Office bosses (i.e. Permanent Secretaries and the 
heads of the six departments) do stand out as a group from the bosses of the 
thirty or so other major UK government departments over the period 1971 
to 1984, in that noticeably fewer of the Scottish Office bosses came from a 
'top-drawer' secondary education, as can be seen from Table 3. A minority 
of them attended private fee-paying schools as against a majority of the 
other UK departmental bosses; none of them attended either Clarendon 
schools (the nine most exclusive public schools in England) or their Scottish 
equivalents (which we took to be Gordonstoun, Fettes, Glenalmond, 
Strathallan and Merchiston Castle) as against a substantial minority of the 
other departmental heads. The proportion of those with an Oxbridge 
(undergraduate) university education is also much smaller among Scottish 
Office bosses than among other departmental bosses (but that conventional 
index of social status is perhaps ambiguous in this case, given that about half 
of Scottish Office bosses have a Scottish university background). Nor is 
there much sign of these characteristics changing over the past fifteen years, 
for either group. 
How much should be built on this is doubtful. Scottish Office bosses do 
seem as a group to come from less exclusive social backgrounds than other 
major UK departmental bosses in general and in that sense might perhaps 
count as 'quite low in the Whitehall pecking order'. On the other hand, 
Scottish Office bosses as a group are not quite proletarian bureaucrats a Ja 
Lenin; like most elites in Britain, they are as a group 'male, middle-aged 
and middle-class' and disproportionately drawn from the higher-status 
academies rather than the general run of local authority schools. Moreover, 
their relative isolation from the old-boy-network of Ox bridge and Britain's 
top private schools has not apparently kept down the Scottish Office's 
position in the pecking orders shown in Table 3. 
Structural Changes 
Apart from considerations of 'pecking order', how far has the structure 
of the Scottish Office changed in an era of retrenchment, and in what 
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TABLE3 
Social Exclusivity: Scottish Office and other bosses, 1971-84 
Scottish Office Permanent Secretaries and Departmental Heads compared 
to Permanent Secretaries and Departmental Heads of the 33 biggest Central 
Goverment Departments1: Educational Background of those appointed 
between 1971 and 1984. 
Secondary Schooling: 
Private fee-paying schools2 
Non-fee-paying schools 

















1 This covers all major UK government departments, but excludes small 
registry offices, art galleries and museums etc. (i.e. small departments 
analogous to the Scottish 'independents'). 
2 'Private fee-paying schools' here means independent and Headmasters' 
Conference schools as listed in Whitaker's Almanac. 
3 Scottish Office figure sums to more than 100 per cent because some 
Scottish Office bosses did undergraduate degrees at Oxbridge as well as 
at Scottish universities. 
directions? We will briefly consider the effect of retrenchment on the 




-ratio of 'core' to 'peripheral' operations 
- blue-collar to white-collar ratio 
- departmental shares of the cake within the Scottish Office 
(a) Specialists-to-generalists ratio. Our earlier study showed the Scottish 
Office departments to be significantly different from other British 
government departments in terms of extent of specialism- as measured by 
a higher proportion of staff employed in special departmental grades and in 
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professional, technological and scientific grades, as against general 
administrative grades. We attributed this characteristic to a 'small country' 
or multum in parvo effect. We concluded that it reflected the administrative 
implications of delivering a similar standard of public services to a 
population which is small in relation to that of England and Wales or ofthe 
UK as a whole, in that it meant a relatively large number of discrete 
specialisms were required. 
If that interpretation was correct, the multum in parvo effect should 
persist during retrenchment. Indeed, if the specialist-intensiveness of the 
Scottish Office departments does indeed reflect the irreducible minimum of 
central administrative specialists who are needed to deliver a complex 
range of modern public services, even in a small country, we would expect 
that the proportion of such specialists would tend if anything to rise as 
absolute staff numbers fall during a period of cutbacks. This expectation 
appears to be confirmed, in that the degree of relative specialism of the 
Scottish Office departments in the sense described above did increase a 
littlefrom the mid-1970s to 1984: the proportion of 'specialists' in that sense 
to total staff (including prison staff) rose from just under 40 per cent in 1975 
to nearly 50 per cent in 1984. 
(b) Chiefs-to-Indians ratio. Another distinctive feature of the Scottish 
Office as a department which was revealed by our earlier study was a high 
proportion of staff in 'top' grades (i.e. Under-Secretary grade and above) 
and 'middle' grades (grades equivalent to Assistant Secretary to HEO 
inclusive), as against central government departments in general. To some 
extent, this characteristic, too, may reflect a 'small country' or multum in 
parvo effect (even a small ship needs a captain and officers) and also -
perhaps more importantly- from the nature of the Scottish Office as a fairly 
'policy-heavy' department working for Ministers who are 400 miles away 
for most of the time and who are obliged to take an interest in matters 
relating to Scottish affairs which go well beyond their formal administrative 
responsibilities. If this is a correct interpretation, we would expect this 
characteristic top- and middle-heaviness to persist during retrenchment, as 
with 'specialists', and we would be surprised to see proportionately heavier 
cuts in the upper as against the lower ranks. 
Indeed, as applied to the 'specialists', we might expect the proportion 
of higher-paid staff to drift upwards in such circumstances. Those on the 
bureaucratic shop-floor or 'coal-face' often complain that it is they who 
suffer disproportionately from cutbacks, as against the middle and upper 
ranks. Policies relying on no (or limited) replacement of staff who leave to 
do the job of reducing staff numbers (instead of deliberately dismissing 
staff) often take their heaviest toll in the lower ranks, where natural 
turnover tends to be somewhat higher, and exceptions are almost 
invariably made to such policies in respect of the topmost posts. (JO) 
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In general, some such effect does seem to have been at work in the 
Scottish Office. Excluding prison staff (who have been explicitly protected 
from civil service manpower cuts since 1979) and the staff of the state 
hospital at Carstairs, the proportion of Scottish Office staff in the 'middle' 
ranks (in the sense described above) rose a little between 1975 and 1983 
from 32 per cent to 35 per cent, and those at the bottom (i.e. on grades 
equivalent to EO and below) fell back from 67 to 65 per cent of the total. 
The effect is very marked in DAFS and SED, where the proportion of 
'middle' to 'bottom' staff changed by 5 per cent or more over this period, 
and it is less sharp but still noticeable for SHHD and Central Services. SDD 
tends to pull the overall average change down, because of its assumption of 
responsibility for managing ancient monument sites in Scotland from PSA 
in 1978, which brought in a large number of lower-graded staff. We will 
return to the position of the individual departments shortly. 
In some ways, this overall tendency to increasing middle- heaviness 
may represent the 'rational bureaucratic' response to cuts (i.e. if you can't 
increase your absolute staff numbers, hire proportionately more staff in 
higher grades if you can). Moreover, it may be easier to follow such a 
pattern of cutbacks in the Scottish Office than in departments which have 
large numbers of individual clients to be served by counter staff in local 
branch offices, since the Scottish Office is in general centralized in 
Edinburgh. (By combining figures supplied in a House of Commons answer 
by Mr Hayhoe (HC Deb 31/10/83, c.186) with 1981 Scottish census data, it 
can be shown that staff numbers of other government departments 
operating in Scotland are much more closely correlated with population per 
hectare by local authority districts in Scotland (r = 0.78) than are numbers 
of Scottish Office staff (r = 0.41).) 
(c) Ratio of 'Core' to 'Peripheral' Operations. It is sometimes said (for 
instance by Glennerster in Hood and Wright (1981), ch.8) that a climate of 
retrenchment will lead bureaucracies to attempt to protect what are 
deemed to be the core of their operations (for instance, full-time staff, 
headquarters apparatus) as against what may be deemed to be marginal or 
peripheral activities - grants or contracts to outsiders, trainees or part-
timers, publicity and research, branch offices. If we follow the logic of that 
kind of argument, we might expect producer group pressures to lead to 
disproportionate cutbacks in payments to outside groups or institutions as 
against staff salary costs in a climate of retrenchment. 
We noted in our earlier study that Scottish Office departments were 
significantly more 'money-moving' in their style of operation than the 
general run of Whitehall departments, in that they spent a smaller 
proportion of their budget on the salaries of their own staff and 
correspondingly more on other items such as grants and contracts- indeed, 
as was shown in Section II, this is a characteristic that the Scottish Office 
departments have shown in an increasingly marked degree over the past 
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century (and Whitehall in general has been moving in this direction for at 
least forty years). If the argument about pressures for 'protecting the 
bureaucratic core' has any force in this case, we might expect to see that 
historical trend going into reverse from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. 
Table 1 above showed no real evidence for any such effect, in that the 
proportion of budget set aside for staff salaries of the 'kernel' Scottish 
Office departments was in fact fractionally smaller in 1984-5 than in 1975-6. 
Nor does the picture change greatly if we look at actual expenditure rather 
than budgeted amounts, on a year-by-year basis rather than at intervals of a 
decade, and exclude prison and other staff who have been protected from 
cutbacks since 1979. The proportion of actual expenditure by the Scottish 
Office going on staff salaries of the six core departments (excluding prisons, 
state hospital, etc.) did not in general rise over the period 1971-2 to 1982-3; 
in fact, it fell slightly, from 1. 7 per cent in 1971-2 to 1.3 per cent in 1982-3. 
So it does not appear as if the bureaucratic core of the Scottish Office has 
positively been protected by eating into the proportion of its budget passed 
out to other groups: the proportions have remained more or less constant, 
however calculated. 
'Protecting the core', however, is not only or necessarily to be equated 
with the protecting of staff salary budgets as against other spending. A 
maxim sometimes applied to bureaucratic responses to pressures for 
retrenchment is that 'when money is short, information is vulnerable', 
meaning that agencies cut down on promotional and research activities in 
order to protect the 'core' of their operations. 
To the extent that any such effect can be observed for the Scottish 
Office, it would take an extremely keen eye to detect it. The sums budgeted 
for public relations spending by or on behalf of the Scottish Office did 
indeed drift down slightly as a proportion of total Scottish Office estimates 
over the decade 1971-2 to 1982-3<11>, but the change is relatively small and, 
since only a tiny fraction of the Scottish Office's spending is officially 
counted as going on 'information' in this sense (much less than 1 per cent of 
total spending), not much could anyway be released for the relief of the 
'core' by savings on this item. The same in general applies to Whitehall as a 
whole. 
The picture for research and development expenditure af.pears to be 
broadly the same, from what published figures are available. (IZ That is, less 
than 1 per cent of Scottish Office expenditure goes into research and 
development as recorded in official statistics, and though R and D 
expenditure fell very slightly as a proportion of total Scottish Office 
spending between 1973/4 and 198112, pressure on other aspects of Scottish 
Office spending could hardly be stemmed by major cutbacks on this item 
alone: at most, it can only be a symbolic gesture. 
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One item of outside spending which has fallen noticeably as a 
proportion of total Scottish Office spending during retrenchment is rate 
support grant to local authorities. RSG (not including Housing Support 
Grant for this purpose) increased as a proportion of total Scottish Office 
spending during the 'years of expansion' in the early 1970s, rising from just 
under one-third in 1971-2 to over 40 per cent in 1975-6, but then fell back to 
just under one-third again in 1982-3. How clearly this fits the 'protecting the 
core' theory, however, is debatable, since (a) it might be argued that cutting 
local government spending was deliberate Cabinet policy at this time rather 
than discretionary behaviour by self-regarding bureaucrats; and (b) the 
proportion of Scottish Office spending 'lost' to local authorities over the 
period of retrenchment has not been appropriated in a correspondingly 
higher proportion of spending on the salaries of Scottish Office 
administrators: rather, it seems to have been redistributed into other types 
of 'outside' spending. 
(d) Blue-collar to white-collar staff ratios. One feature which we might 
expect from a bureaucracy going through a period of retrenchment is the 
replacement of services once performed by specially-employed blue-collar 
staff (so-called 'industrial' civil servants) by services provided on contract 
by outside enterprises. Part of the general Whitehall story over recent 
decades (and certainly since 1976, as a response to pressures for staff cuts) 
has been a continuous thinning of the ranks of 'industrial' or blue-collar 
civil servants and their substitution by services provided on contract. In the 
middle 1950s there were four industrial civil servants for every six non-
industrial or white-collar civil servants; by the 1980s, there was only one 
industrial civil servant for every five non- industrials. 
However, the Scottish Office did not appear to follow this trend to 
anything like the same degree as its Whitehall counterparts in the 1970s and 
1980s. Its blue-collar labour force in fact increased substantially between 
1975 and 1983, both absolutely and as a proportion of total staff, as can be 
seen from Figure 2. As Figure 2 shows, the increase largely reflects the 
importation of responsibility for ancient monuments from PSA in 1978; but 
even since 1980, numbers of blue-collar staff have not been reduced by a 
greater proportion than numbers of white-collar staff. It is interesting to 
speculate on the reasons why the Scottish Office has not up to now followed 
the same path as its Whitehall counterparts in respect of laying off blue-
collar workers. A possible explanation is that many industrial staff in the 
Scottish Office work (in fairly small numbers) in close conjunction with a 
variety of 'policy' or scientific establishments, or in tasks such as fishery 
patrols that are not readily 'contractable out' to private security 
enterprises, so that the only major substitution of contract work for the 
employment of blue-collar civil servants in the Scottish Office to date has 
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FIGURE 2 
'BLUE COLLAR' STAFF COMPONENT OF 
SCOTTISH OFFICE DEPARTMENTS 
Cumulative percentage share of Scottish 
Office Total staff ) 
This, plus the other 90 per cent, is the 
'white collar' component of the Scottish Office. 
Prisons and state hospital 
SHHO 
Central Services 
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 
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(e) Departmental Shares of the Cake - Proportionate Sacrifice or Selective 
Cuts? In contrast to the idea that public bureaucracies seek to protect their 
'cores' by disproportionate cutbacks on types of activity deemed by 
producers to be 'peripheral' (a view for which not much evidence can 
readily be found in the case of the Scottish Office, with the possible 
exception of rate support grant) is the idea that cutbacks tend to be 
accommodated by strategies of 'equal misery'. It is often assumed that the 
reflex reaction of public bureaucracies towards pressures for retrenchment 
- at least in the first instance- is to distribute cutbacks equally among their 
component parts (cf. Hood and Wright, 1981). Each unit is called upon to 
produce the same percentage sacrifices in staff and budget, in order to 
avoid the delays and bitter in-fighting that may result from attempts to 
impose cuts in a selective fashion. So we might expect the long-term pattern 
of 'unbalanced growth' of the Scottish Office which was remarked upon in 
Section II (that is, the fact that its component parts have not grown in strict 
proportion to one another over the long term) to change into a pattern of 
strict proportionality during a period of retrenchment intended to keep the 
Scottish Office's total size constant or to make it smaller. 
To a considerable extent, 'equal misery' in this sense does seem to have 
prevailed among the component departments of the Scottish Office during 
retrenchment. Figure 3 shows shares of total Scottish Office staff and 
budget for the individual departments over the period 1973-4 to 1982-3; 
and, as can be seen, none of the departments quite went from riches to rags 
relative to the others, or vice-versa. 
Nevertheless, the picture is not one of totally 'equal misery'. The 
nearest to a riches-to-rags story is that of OAFS, whose share of total 
Scottish Office staff and spending slumped by 6 per cent and 3 per cent 
respectively over the period shown in Figure 3. The nearest to a rags-to-
riches story is that of SHHD, whose share of Scottish Office spending rose 
by 7 per cent over the same period, while the share of total Scottish Office 
staff accounted for by SHHD's prison staff increased by over 5 per cent 
(though the staff of SHHD on its own fell back very slightly as a proportion 
of the Scottish Office total). No doubt if it were possible to disaggregate 
these figures into 'Home' and 'Health', it could be shown that SHHD's 
fortunes reflect in large part the decision of the Conservative government 
since 1979 to protect law and order activities from spending cutbacks, 
although the trend is observable before 1979, as can be seen from Figure 3. 
Other changes in the intra-Scottish Office pecking order are harder to 
detect. However, three further points are perhaps worth noting about the 
behaviour of the separate departments within the Scottish Office group in 
response to pressures for retrenchment - differences in behaviour which 
can be masked by considering the Scottish Office as an aggregate unit. 
First, it is interesting to note that it is those departments which have 
slumped in the league both in staff and budget shares of the Scottish Office 
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'cake' (that is, DAFS and SED) which have been the ones in which the 
greatest increase has taken place in the proportion of middle-grade to 
lower-grade staff. Changes in the proportion of staff by grade level for each 
of the six departments between 1975 and 1983 are summarized in Figure 4. 
Second, as is shown in Figure 5, DAFS and SED are also the only two 
departments in which the proportion of 'specialists' (in the sense described 
earlier) to general administrative staff increased over the five years 1979 to 
1983. Clearly, it would be risky to build much on this, since the changes are 
slight and the picture is to some degree base-year-sensitive. But this 
perhaps points in the same direction as our earlier findings, in that it seems 
to be lower-grade, non-specialist staff who are exposed to proportionately 
greater cutbacks when the pressure is on for retrenchment. 
Third, a point about blue-collar ratios. We noted earlier that the 
Scottish Office in aggregate has not apparently followed the general 
'Whitehall' trend of cutting back disproportionately on blue-collar 
industrial staff as against white-collar staff as a means of getting overall staff 
numbers down. Does this reflect a common response among the four 
Scottish Office departments which employ blue-collar staff (CS, DAFS, 
SHHD, SDD)? To some extent, the aggregate Scottish Office figure 
reflects what has happened to SDD, which in 1978 imported large numbers 
of blue-collar staff from PSA in connection with its acquisition of 
responsibility for maintaining ancient monuments. But even if, to avoid 
that complication, we take the picture only from 1978 to 1983, there is little 
sign of change. Industrial staff did fall slightly in two of the departments 
involved (DAFS and SHHD) and rose slightly in the other two (CS and 
SDD). But the change was less than one and a half per cent in all cases, 
meaning that none of the four departments has vigorously pursued a 
retrenchment strategy of exposing blue-collar staff to disproportionate 
cuts. Figure 6 shows industrial staff in each department as a proportion of 
total Scottish Office industrial staff between 1974 and 1983. It seems 
possible that there is some general 'Scottish effect' (whether it be relating to 
the size of the country or to administrative culture) reflected in these 
relatively uniform responses, and not just an average concealing very 
different retrenchment strategies at departmental level. 
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Over the period considered here, the Scottish Office has moved from a 
background of nearly a century's growth to a foreground of nearly a 
decade's retrenchment. Pressure for curbing growth in the civil service had 
flattened the 'natural growth' curve described by the staff of the Scottish 
office from the 1880s to the mid-1970s. But the Scottish Office has 
apparently maintained its place in the pecking order relative to a group of 
other major departments on a number of indices. Perhaps this is because of 
its 'broad portfolio' of responsibilities, some of which have proved to be 
'growth stocks' (prisons, law and order), to some degree offsetting losses in 
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FIGURE 6 
'BLUE COLLAR' STAFF COMPONENT 
OF SCOTTISH OFFICE DEPARTMENTS 
(Cumulative percentage share of Scottish 
Office industrial staff ) 
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other sectors of the portfolio during a period of overall attempts at 
retrenchment. Over the past decade or so the Scottish Office has retained 
distinctive characteristics such as a high proportion of staff in top and 
middle ranks, a high proportion of staff in 'specialist' grades and a high 
proportion of spending devoted to items other than the salaries of its own 
staff; indeed, some of these features appear to have become somewhat 
more marked under pressures for retrenchment. 
To some extent, 'equal misery' seems to have prevailed among the 
Scottish Office's component departments during a period of cutbacks, 
though the fortunes and behaviour of the individual departments have not 
been completely identical. In general, though, the evidence ofthe extent to 
which producer group pressures (i.e. pressures reflecting the interest and 
convenience of producers rather than consumers of public services) have 
dominated the response to retrenchment is somewhat mixed and in some 
cases effects are hard to see, given that bureaucratic structures change 
slowly. Much depends on how much significance one is willing to read into 
relatively small changes in percentage shares, and this is unavoidable. A 
week may be a long time in politics; a decade or so is not necessarily very 
long in the life of a bureaucracy. 
Might the growth in numbers of Scottish Office bureaucrats have 
levelled off in time, even without retrenchment, as the department reached 
some kind of natural limit either of maximum politically controllable size 
for a heterogeneous and top-heavy department or of major Scottish-related 
functions easily appropriable from other central departments? We cannot 
say. It is a common enough observation that bureaucracies tend to develop 
rapidly in their early years, then level off into a more sedate pace of change 
and place increasing emphasis on protecting what they have as against 
finding new worlds to conquer (Dowas 1967,<13) goes so far as to propose 
this as a 'Law of Increasing Conservatism'). The Scottish Office, however, 
did not follow this pattern in exact or classical style- for instance, its staff 
numbers grew at a fairly constant, not a decreasing, rate for 90 years before 
levelling off, and its budgetary advances likewise continued over a very 
long period. Moreover, the fortunes of the Scottish 'independents', as 
described in Section II, seem to indicate that very long-established 
bureaucracies can grow vigorously late in their lives. We are thus doubtful if 
there are any infallible laws of bureaucratic development from which the 
future of the Scottish Office can be predicted. (1 4) The only thing that can be 
said with certainty about the future is that it hasn't happened yet.<Js) 
This inquiry has been restricted to the readily measurable and 
countable aspects of Scottish Office administration. In future work, we 
hope to do a little more in the same vein, in developing some comparisons 
between the Scottish departments and central government departments 
more generally, in terms of responses to pressures for retrenchment. But 
we would be the first to admit that the approach taken here has its limits, 
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cannot easily get at the 'fine grain', and that many intangible or qualitative, 
but nevertheless important, aspects of bureaucratic change cannot be 
encompassed by it. Not all administrative analysis can be done 'by 
numbers', especially when the numbers are taken from 'unobtrusive' 
inquiry, as has been the case here. Even so, it is the onlywayoftellingsome 
parts of the story. 
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